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behalf of themselves and all other persons
similarly situated, both as taxpayers of the
City of Ogden and as residents and homeowners
in a dedicated subdivision of Ogden City.
The Appellants seek a determination as to
whether or not an ordinance passed by Ogden
City closing and vacating a public street/
which is a part of the dedicated subdivision
in Argonne Park Plat, and the giving of that
street to the Ogden City Board of Education
without any compensation whatsoever being
paid to the Appellants, was a valid exercise
of the authority and power of the Ogden City
Council, and further, whether the closing
off and taking away of a dedicated street in
a private dedicated subdivision without the
consent of the qualified electors of the
City of Ogden or the homeowners of the platted
subdivision and without payment of consideration constitutes the taking of property
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without Due Process of Law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants, who were the Plaintiffs
in the Lower Court, having filed a class
action as provided for under 78-33-1, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended in 1953, seek a
determination of the right of the Respondents,
who were the Defendants in the action in the
Lower Court, to vacate the aforesaid public
and dedicated street and the authority of
Ogden City to give said street by Quit Claim
Deed to the Ogden City Board of Education
without the payment of any compensation whatso
ever to any of the property owners residing
in the dedicated Plat, wherein the City street
is a part thereof, and without the consent
of the electorate for the giving of said
property to the Ogden City Board of Education.
Ttie Lower Court, at the time of a hearing
on a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, granted
an Order and Judgment granting dismissal of
the class action of the Plaintiffs with
prejudice, thereby validating the action of
the Ogden City Council in the closing of the
street and the giving of same by Quit Claim
Deed to the Ogden City Board of Education.
The Appellants seek a reversal of the
dismissal in the Lower Court and a Declaratory
Order from the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah as to the matters set forth in the
Complaint of the Appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 31, 1921, a dedication Plat was
submitted to Ogden City for the purpose of
additioning Argonne Park to Ogden City, requesting that the same be dedicated and that the
annexed Plat be set apart and the dedicated
streets be used as a public thoroughfare
forever. CR-26)
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Plat was accepted by Ogden City as an
addition and the street in question, which is
29th Street from Harrison Boulevard to Tyler
Avenue was a part of Argonne Park, together
with an area from Harrison Boulevard to Polk
Avenue and from 28th Street through to 29th
Street.

The dedicated plat contained streets

and many lots. (R-26)

The City Recorder

certified the annexed plat of Argonne Park
Addition as accepted by the Board of Commissioners of Ogden City on the 1st day of
February, 1921. (R-27)
The Plaintiffs herein, as well as the
class represented, in the instant cause of
action before this Court represents persons
who are homeowners in the area dedicated as
Argonne Park, as well as other citizens who
reside on the East Bench of Ogden City and
have reason to use 29th Street as an arterial
thoroughfare in order to traverse to their
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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homes and property. (R-112, Pl.Exh.B and C)
The Ogden City Mayor and Council passed
an ordinance No. 1-74, which ordinance would
vacate 29th Street as a public street from
the east line of Harrison Boulevard to the
west line of Tyler Avenue on the east and did
convey said property by Quit Claim Deed to
the Ogden City Board of Education. (R-27, R751
The Ogden City Board of Education maintains
a high school, which is in an abutting area
on both sides of 29th Street between Harrison
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, and desires the
acquisition of said property and its use for
tlie purpose of preventing its use as a public
thoroughfare.

Conveyance of the City dedicated

street was made by a Quit Claim Deed to the
Ogden City Board of Education and no consideration was paid by said Board of Education for
the acquisition of said public street. (R-80)
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That at a regular session of the Ogden
City Planning Commission held January 2, 1974,
a resolution was adopted, that the request of
the Ogden City School Board for the closure
of the 29th Street area be denied, in that
the advantages to be derived from closure
of said street was not sufficiently substantial
to warrant the closure of an established,
improved, and long-used street, (R-4)
The Weber County Planning Commission, in
its report of August 31, 1973, in its response
to a request to review the Ogden City Board
of Education's Petition, to vacate said street,
advised that the vacating was not in the best
interest of the citizens of Ogden City, in
that the use of said street would not constitute a safety hazard to the students using
the facilities of the school abutting said
street and that the closure was being sought
on the basis of esthetic values. (R-49, -50)
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A traffic engineering study was made by
the Ogden Area Transportation Study Staff
and submitted by Donald E. Godfrey, recommended
that after a traffic engineering study, that
the study was supportive of the position taken
by the Traffic Department in a joint memorandum to R. L. Larson, Ogden City Manager,
dated August 31, 1973, wherein the study showed
that the aforesaid street did not constitute
a hazard necessitating its closure. (R-44)
The Greater Ogden Chamber of Commerce
Board of Directors, at a meeting held
September 21, 1973, passed a resolution that
the Board of the Chamber was opposed to the
closing of the aforesaid street.
That the exhibits presently before the
Court consisting of the Petition of the residents
of the area of Argonne Park, together with the
Petition of citizens who are residents of the
area adjacent to Argonne Park and who are users
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of said street, as well as an editorial in
the Ogden Standard Examiner, all objecting
to and in opposition to the closure of said
street. (R-49, R-58)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN DEDICATED
STREET.
The Appellants herein are persons who are
homeowners and are the purchasers of lots
which was originally dedicated in the Argonne
Park, and that as a part of the dedicated
plat contained as one of the streets therein,
the public street which the City of Ogden has
quit claimed to the Ogden City Board of
Education. (R-55, R-59)
This Court had reason to decide the ownership rights of individual lot holders in a
dedicated plat in the case of Tuttle vs.
Sowadzki, et al, 126 P. 959, (1912).
-9-

This
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Court stated that the Law was to the affect
that purchasers who buy lots with reference
to a map or plat, which is authorized by the
owner of the ground and which shows streets
which are dedicated in said plat, gives to
the lot purchasers a right to have such street
maintained and the right to prevent the owner
from vacating or obstructing the same.

This

Court further held that in addition to the
public easement, that the individual purchaser
of the lots also acquire a private easement
and constitutes a property right which can
only be taken from them or obstructed by
making proper compensation therefor.
This Court further held in the Tuttle case,
that it is a well settled law, that a public
street or highway may be vacated against the
wish of abutting owners provided that just
compensation is made to such owners.
This Court determined similar questions
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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previously in Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County/
104 P. Ill, (1909).

The Court held in

Sowadzki, that in the dedication of a street/
a fee that is conveyed to the city is to the
surface only and this is only for public use
for all purposes of a street or highway/ and
that such fee is a limited or a determinable
fee and is created only for a special purpose
or purposes only.
This Court had reason to recall the previous
decisions of the Supreme Court in dealing with
the abandonment or transfer of title to city
streets in the case of Boskovich vs. Midvale
City/ 243 py2d 435/ (1952)/ wherein the Midvale
City Corporation enacted an ordinance giving
to the Board of Education which abutted on
both sides of a particular public street title
to said street and the right to close same.
The street had been created by a private,
recorded, and accepted subdivision in Midvale.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Court held in the Boskovich case,
that a city by ordinance may vacate or abandon
streets, even in a subdivision, if public
exigency requires and if procedure is followed
satisfying the statutory requirements and
requirements of Due Process and the consideration of any substantial rights involved thereby.
This Court holding that where a street is
closed by ordinance, that the enactment itself
of the ordinance is not sufficient, nor is the
taking without just compensation.
This Court distinguished the Boskovich case
on the basis that it was a duly private subdivision containing streets and alleys. The
easement of the owners of lots in a dedicated
subdivision have a private easement even upon
the City's abandonment of its public easement
and the taking of the private easement requires,
in addition to valid Due Process hearings, the
payment of just compensation.

That the method

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be employed by the City in such an instance
is through the proper use of the rights and
powers under the statute pertaining to eminent
domain.
This Court had occasion to make a distinction
as between the use of a street which constitutes
a privilege and the use of a street which
constitutes a property right in making its
determination in the case of Stringham vs. Salt
Lake City, 201 P.2d 758, and this Court quoted
from McQuillan, Municipal Corporations/ 2nd Ed.,
Vol,' 3, Sec/ 981, p. 217;
"ft**!^ the control of streets and
public ways, a municipality is a
trustee for the entire public, and
as such trustee, it should permit
nothing to be done that will interfere
with the condition of the streets or
of their free use by all alike***."
This Court further emphasized the distinction
as to the distinction between use and property
rights, in citing from the case of Thompson
vs. Smith, 155 Vt. 367, 154 S.E. 579, wherein
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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it stated:
"Use of streets for ordinary purposes
of life is a right. It is not a
mere privilege like the privilege
of moving a house in the street,
operating a business stand in the
street, or transporting persons or
property for hire along the street,
which a city may permit or prohibit
at will."
The Lower Court in its bench ruling in
the instant matter (R-123, -125) summarized
all of the arguments of the Appellants as to
the vested rights of the Appellants in their
claim of vested property rights to the dedicated
street by the Court stating:
"This is a legislative debate and
decision and not a judicial decision
at all. The Court refuses to take
any action. It's strictly a legislative decision. The powers and
persons aggrieved must direct their
grievance to the legislative branches
of the government."
The Appellants suggest that this Court, as
well as the Lower Court, has a judicial right
as well as a duty in a Complaint seeking a
Declaratory Judgment and interpretation of
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the action of a city governing body, to determine the meanings of statutes cited by the
Appellants, as well as to make a determination
of the rights and privileges of the aggrieved
Appellants and to weigh the equities of the
taking of the public property from its citizens
and giving of such property without compensation
to a Board of Education.
The Court, in its bench ruling (R-123),
stated that it took judicial notice of the
State's statutes in the series 10-8-8, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended 1953, and in the
series of statutes commencing at 10-8-8.1,
which was enacted in 1955 and which the Court
alleged set up definite procedures for vacating
streets.

The Court, thereupon, stated in the

instant matter before this Court:
"There is no merit in this case
insofar as statutes are concerned.
I believe the statutes have been
ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court
in Stone vs. Salt Lake City and
other decisions in 1960 and later.
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is no question that a legislative
body either County Commissioners or
City fathers can vacate dedicated
streets if they follow normal procedures,
otherwise government can never change
and that this can be done," (R-123)
It is submitted to this Honorable Court,
that the holding in Stone vs. Salt Lake City,
356 P.2d 631, (1960), is not at all pertinent
to the instant matter before the Court, in
that in the Stone case there were two issues
involved, one being the purchase of city
property by a church and whether or not there
was a violation of statutory or constitutional
law in regards thereto, the other question
involved was whether or not a building owned
by the city and for which it had no longer any
use could be sold to the United States government directly or indirectly for the purpose
of allowing the erection of a federal building
on such street.
This Court did not allege that the statutes
dealing with streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sidewalks, parks, airports, and public grounds
was not pertinent to the use by a municipal
government of its conduct in relation to such
streets, alleys, etc., but ruled that in the
Stone case, the particular statutes referred
to were pertinent only as to such streets,
parks, etc., but did not have application to
the sale of a public building to which the
city no longer had a valid use.
The Court, in ruling in the Stone case, did
not refer at all to the statutory series
10-8-8.1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1955,
but did refer to 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated/
1953, after setting forth the wording of the
statute, this Court stated:
"The familiar and universally recognized
rule is that general terms following
specific terms are interpreted to mean
things of like character. While those
cases are sound as to streets and parks,
(emphasis added) we can see nothing
in that statute which would require
. the sale of the public safety building
to be considered as coming within its
.., terms, nor do we find any expressed
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provision in our statutes which
would prohibit the procedure followed
here."
POINT II
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
In Hall vs. North Ogden City; 166 P.2d 221,
(1946), the Supreme Court traced the beginnings
of the history of establishing dedicated tracts
of land/ commencing with the Compiled Laws of
1876 under the Teritorial Town Site Act, setting
forth in that and subsequent laws, such as the
Compiled Laws of 1888, a manner and method of
dedicating town sites and subdivisions therein,
together with the vesting of a trusteeship
rights in the municipality or county governments
providing for the vested rights of those who
acquire lots in dedicated town sites as to
the use of public streets, set forth in the
dedication of such town sites or subdivisions.
The Courts have consistently noted throughout
—18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the entire chain of cases, such as in Tuttle
vs. Sowadzki, supra; Knight vs. Thomas, 101 P.
383, (1909); Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake City,
supra; White vs. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 210,
C1952); Stringham vs. Salt Lake City, 201 P.2d
758, (1949); Premium Oil Company vs. Cedar
City, 187 P.2d 199, (1947); Bonner vs. Sudberry,
417 P.2d 646, (1966); Mallory vs. Taggart,
470 P.2d 254, (1970), and in many other cases
too numerous to necessitate the listing herein,
that there are specific Utah Statutes which
grant specific rights to a governmental body, as
well as stressing the proprietary and property
rights existing in particular classes of persons
who are part of a town site, subdivision, or
abuttors to property, and the legislature of
this State, as well as the previous territorial
government, set forth specific methods of taking
of private property, including streets of
governmental bodies, providing at all times for
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a Due Process method of hearing, notice, and
compensation where there is a vested right
in a owner of property affected.
Other states had early developed laws along
this line which have been subsequently adopted
by other states from already existing laws of
sister states in order to perfect the method
of Due Process taking of property or in the
dedication of streets in such states.
Payne vs. City of Laramie, Wyoming, 398 P.2d
557, C1965), the Supreme Court of Wyoming in
an appeal from a lower Wyoming Court which had
denied to Plaintiffs and Appellants the right
to a vacated street, the City had by Quit
Claim Deed sold a street that had been vacated,
and held that the City of Laramie did not have
a fee simple in the street, and held that
where property had been dedicated, the City
had a title in trust for the public to the
street, and upon being vacated, the City could
-20Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not sell the street by a Quit Claim Deed.
The Court held:
"We remain of the view, that a
dedication thereunder, absence some
other applicable statute, does not
vest in a municipality a fee in
the premises set apart for streets
which, upon vacation of the streets,
can be bartered and sold by the
municipality."
In Mochel vs. Cleveland, 51 Id. 468, 5 P.2d
549, the Court affirmed the doctrine, that
acknowledgement and recording while equivalent
to a deed in fee simple is not a deed in fee
simple and does not give the public the same
right to sell or dispose of the same that a
private party has to land for which he holds
the title in fee simple.

The Court held, that

there was at best a title in trust for the
public granting the city the right to hold,
use, occupy, and enjoy the premises for public
use as a street, and that once that right was
terminated by vacation pursuant to authority
delegated to the city by the legislature, the
-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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city no longer had any title or interest in
the premises and had nothing to sell or convey.
In the instant matter before this Court/
we have the undisputed evidence of the dedication of a plat upon which were set forth certain
specific streets, wherein the dedication itself
as set forth in the official records of the
Ogden City Recorder, stated as follows (R-2,
-31:
"We, the undersigned owners of the
land mentioned and shown on the
annexed plat of Argonne Plat Addition,
do hereby dedicate, grant, and convey
unto Ogden City all those parts or
portions of said land belonging to
us and lying and being embraced
within the boundaries of the streets
and avenues as shown on the annexed
plat, to be set apart and used as
public thoroughfares forever."
The legislature of the State as set forth in
10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, et seq., as
well as 10-8-8.1, et seq., set out the manner
of petitioning and hearing for the closing of
a street. Nowhere among the quoted statutes
-22Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is there a direct authority by the legislature
for the taking of private property of others,
such as a dedicated street/ without compensation
The Legislature has also seen fit by the
Municipal Planning Enabling Act/ 10-9-19/ Utah
Code Annotated/ 1953/ et seq.f to provide for
planning by commission/ together with input
from the citizens of the community affected/
as well as a long range master plan to be
conformed to by both city and county governments
to provide for an orderly use of property in
the growth and development of communities/ and
prevent the surreptitious destruction of the
rights of the citizenry without professional
planning and hearings in the use of areas
within a governmental body.
10-9-20/ Utah Code Annotated/ 1953f specifically provides that it is the function and
duty of the Planning Commission after holding
public hearings to make and adopt a master plan
-23Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for the physical development of a municipality,
and the statute further provides in 10-9-23,
that before there is an addition of new
streets or vacating of a street, that before
any such action can be taken by the legislative
body, there shall be a public hearing thereof
and shall be submitted to the Planning Commissior
for its approval.

It is provided in 10-9-24,

Utah Code Annotated, amended 1953, that there
shall be a public hearing held by the Board
prior to its adopting any action*
In the instant matter before the Court, the
Planning Commission of Ogden City held the
closure of the street as not being in the best
interest of the citizens of the community. (R-45)
That the only public hearing held on the matter
was held by the Ogden City Council, whereby
they invited the Planning Commission to be
present at a joint meeting, which the Appellants
submit to the Court is not the equivalent of a
-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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private public meeting held by the Planning
Commission to obtain the input from its
citizens.
The Weber County Planning Commission through
its planning chairman, Graham Shiria, its
public work director, Rulon Sorenson, and its
traffic engineer, Don Godfrey, made a report
to R. L. Larsen, Ogden City Manager, opposing
the vacating of 29th Street, suggesting that
if the school desires to enhance its campus
continuity, that there are other esthetic
solutions available which would provide campus
continuity and still maintain a public street.
CR-49, -501
The Ogden Standard Examiner editorial (R-54)
sets forth in general the perspective of what
the closure of 29th Street means to the general
citizenry as well as can be obtained from the
exhibits tR-51, R-53, and R-55 through R-58),
all setting forth the opposition of Argonne
-25Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Park Plat residents and homeowners who are
opposed to the loss of their arterial thoroughfare.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable
Court, that the refusal of the Lower Court
to make a ruling on the Complaint in Declaratory
Judgment, and to allow an evidentiary trial
and argument as to the merits and meaning of
the statute and constitutional principles
involved in the taking away and closing of a
dedicated public street, together with the
giving of same by Quit Claim Deed to the Ogden
City Board of Education, all without compensation to the persons damaged and aggrieved by
such conduct and without Due Process hearing,
was not a legislative matter but was a matter
for the judiciary to determine or to allow to
proceed to a determination, and that upon the
failure of the Lower Court to so act, that
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the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has the
power and duty to enter a Declaratory Judgment
based upon the admitted facts and record before
this Honorable Court, and that this Court should
declare the taking of such dedicated public
street without compensation or proper Due
Process hearing to the Appellants and the class
represented by the Appellants, as in contradiction of the Constitution and Statutes of the
State of Utah, and declare the act of the City
of Ogden giving a Quit Claim Deed to said
street to the Ogden City Board of Education
as a nullity.
Respectfully submitted,

By

&*£??'Z2^^

PETE N. VLAHOS of
VLAHOS & GALE
Suite 312 Eccles Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellants
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